Should the energy transition be reframed as a trade resilience strategy, asks Mariam Tzannatos, decarbonisation analyst and Maritime Strategies International. The conflict in the Middle East has once again exposed a structural feature of the global energy system: concentration risk. Roughly one-fifth of global oil trade transits the Strait of Hormuz. LNG flows from Qatar are similarly dependent on the same corridor. Seaborne crude and condensate flows through the Strait of Hormuz total around 14m barrels per day, excluding Iran and a further 5 Mn b/d of refined products. These volumes represent roughly 20% of global oil demand and an even higher share of seaborne oil trade. On a typical day, around 600-700 tankers transit the strait, including large numbers of VLCCs that dominate crude cargo movements. When instability rises, insurance premiums spike, freight rates adjust, and voyage distances increase as vessels reroute. The effect is immediate and measurable. For shipping markets, this is not new. What is striking is how little the structural exposure has changed. The global fossil fuel system remains geographically concentrated, with production tied to geology and trade flows to chokepoints. Security risks are embedded in the system’s architecture. Moments like these raise the question of whether the energy transition should be reframed not only as a climate imperative but also as a trade resilience strategy. Resource dependency vs production optionality While oil and gas production is location-bound, depending on whether states possess commercially viable reserves, hydrogen and its derivatives are different. In a fossil-based system, disruption in one region can have disproportionate global effects. Green hydrogen production is not constrained by geology. It is constrained by capital, renewable resources and infrastructure buildout. Sun, wind and water are far more geographically distributed than hydrocarbon basins, creating an important distinction between the two. In a hydrogen-derivatives system, production hubs could emerge across multiple continents, with trade over shorter distances, such as North Africa supplying Europe. Trade would not disappear. Shipping demand would remain, but the concentration risk could be reduced. Instead of freight markets reacting primarily to geopolitical flashpoints in oil-exporting regions, risk becomes more focused on renewable buildout timelines, policy certainty and infrastructure deployment. From a shipowner perspective, this shifts the risk profile from geopolitics toward capital and regulatory execution. Large-scale green ammonia projects are already clustering in familiar regions such as the Middle East, Australia, Chile, and parts of North Africa. Electrolyser supply chains remain concentrated in specific manufacturing hubs, and the need for critical minerals introduces new dependencies. In other words, the energy system may shift its geography, but it will not eliminate interdependence. The more relevant distinction, however, is not independence versus dependence. It is single-region dominance versus diversified production optionality. Shipping finds itself in a uniquely dual-stakes challenging position. The industry is not just a mover of hydrocarbons; it is a consumer, too. This double role puts it at the heart of the transition conversation, with more at stake than ever before. A prolonged period of fossil fuel volatility reinforces the case for diversifying marine fuel supply. At the