Growing Houthi risk could amplify inefficiencies across tanker trade flows in International Shipping News 03/04/2026 Escalating Houthi attacks against Israeli targets signal potential maritime sabotage ahead, threatening to reshape global tanker trade flows and introduce significant inefficiencies into an already strained supply chain. We analyse how redirecting crude exports via the Cape of Good Hope could nearly triple tonne-miles out of Yanbu, favor specific tanker benchmarks, and shift clean product trades in unexpected directions. Overview of the current situation On March 28, Yemen’s Houthis announced the launch of ballistic missiles against Israeli infrastructure – marking the one-month anniversary of heightened US-Iran tensions. While attacks have remained confined to onshore targets, this escalation foreshadows a potential return to commercial shipping sabotage across the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb (BeM) Strait. Our analysis uses Kpler vessel and cargo-tracking data to quantify rerouting and tonne-mile impacts. Key takeaways Houthi attacks currently target Israeli infrastructure rather than commercial shipping, yet military pressure on Iran could trigger renewed maritime sabotage. Redirecting Yanbu crude exports via the COGH would nearly triple tonne-miles, favoring Suezmaxes and Atlantic VLCC benchmarks. Unlike the 2024 East-to-West LR2 boost, current support stems from West-to-East trades, and from shifting UK/Continent MR volumes toward LR2s. Impact on crude trades Control over the BeM has become increasingly important for crude trades since the onset of regional conflict. The de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) forced Saudi Arabia to redirect exports to the Red Sea via the East-West pipeline. Exports rose to 4.6 million barrels per day (Mbd) in the second fortnight of March versus approximately 760 kbd over 2025. Shifting route preferences While SoH transits have dominated market attention, friction in BeM routing emerged earlier in the conflict. This pattern appears most clearly in UK/Continent (excluding Russia) trades to East of Suez markets: Following the November ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, flows briefly resumed via the Suez Canal. By March, the Cape of Good Hope re-emerged as the preferred route. At least 60% of underway volumes now opt for the longer COGH routing. Affected grades include CPC, BTC, and Forties. The Houthis’ recent involvement should sustain COGH as the preferred routing for these trades, supporting TD6 and TD19 benchmarks. Potential disruption scenarios Should commercial shipping become a target in the BeM – whether by Houthis or Iran directly – we anticipate the following consequences: Logistical challenges under disruption A full BeM disruption would force Saudi Arabia’s output westward via the Suez Canal and around the COGH to serve Asian buyers. This creates substantial inefficiencies: Cargo downsizing: Vessels would need to shift from VLCCs to Suezmaxes, or operate VLCCs at partial loads to comply with Suez draft limits. Loading optimisation: Yanbu terminal operations would require restructuring to optimise loadings of smaller or partially loaded vessels. Suez congestion management: Increased traffic through the canal would create bottlenecks. Shuttle trade development: Market economics may support shuttle services beyond the Suez Canal, followed by reverse lightering in the Mediterranean. Increased ballast legs: More empty return voyages would amplify demand dynamics. Marke