SANCTIONS – Recent Deceptive Practices Introduction Since 2010, considerable sanctions’ activity has been directed at shipping and its supporting industries reflecting the fact that 90% of world trade involves the carriage of goods by sea.   The purpose of this Circular is to draw Members’ attention to some of the recent deceptive practices employed by parties that are engaged in activities that offend the sanctions regimes operated by national governments and or supranational bodies such as the UN.   Current Deceptive Practices Observed by the International Group and its Commercial Partners Whilst trade sanctions are applied widely by governments to promote individual foreign policy objectives, the following jurisdictions are particularly relevant in the context of controlled activities in maritime trade:   Iran Syria Venezuela Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Crimea Cuba Belorussia   Cargoes traded in breach of international and national trade sanctions appear to be on the increase. Iranian oil exports, initially heavily restricted by sanctions programmes are now thought to have risen from an estimated 340,000 barrels per day in following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA to an estimated 1.3million barrels per day in March 2021 [1] . In recent weeks oil swap deals involving Iranian and Venezuelan oil cargoes destined for Asian markets have been widely reported in the press [2] . In September 2021 the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts on DPRK published an interim report detailing widespread infringements of UN sanctions involving shipping and the DPRK. The report can be accessed by clicking on this link S_2021_777_E.pdf (securitycouncilreport.org) .   Some of the techniques used to break sanctions have been in use for several years, while others are newer and have become more prevalent in the last 18 months. All aim to minimise surveillance and detection through confusion or concealment of the identities of vessels