3 months into the conflict: What’s new? in Oil & Companies News 25/05/2026 Following up on my previous article about the loss of oil supplies from the Strait of Hormuz, this article examines some of the repercussions after almost three months into the conflict and reflects on how seaborne flows and crude inventories have evolved since then. In this analysis, the 2024 average will serve as the baseline to standardise exports and imports for comparison. Despite the record loss in oil exports via the Strait of Hormuz, Brent front-month futures have remained mostly rangebound between $90/bbl and $115/bbl since the conflict began, suggesting the market is now pricing oil within a new range relative to pre-conflict levels, as long as the supply disruption continues. From a supply perspective, the net-loss in global crude/condensate liftings (excluding re-export origins) between March and May has stabilised at around -4 mbd relative to the 2024 average baseline (see chart below). These volumes would have been more adverse if compared to the 2025 average baseline, as crude liftings increased last year. The additional supplies from the rest of the world outside the Middle East Gulf have contributed significantly to covering the shortfall in crude/condensate supplies. Notably, the redirection of pipeline flows via the Red Sea was by far the largest contributor, though it does not constitute additional supply to the market; rather, it reduces supply loss. Other regions such as the Gulf of Mexico, South America East Coast, Black Sea and Caspian, Caribbean, and West Africa contributed about 80% of the increases in overall crude/condensate liftings (excluding from the Red Sea). Most of this growth in May came from seven countries: US, Kazakhstan, Brazil, Venezuela, Canada, Nigeria and Guyana. Left chart: Global seaborne crude/condensate liftings by origin shipping region (bars) and total (line) vs 2024 average baseline (mbd)[GM1] Right chart: Seaborne crude/condensate lifting