Japan’s energy security response is creating a renewables blind spot in General Energy News 28/04/2026 Rising geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have once again exposed Japan’s dependence on imported fossil fuels, particularly liquefied natural gas (LNG) transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. Recent price increases have compounded concerns about supply security and fuel import costs. The Japanese government has responded to these challenges by reducing LNG use through increased coal-fired generation and restarting nuclear power plants, positioning these sources as providers of stable and affordable domestic supply. This approach may result in unintended consequences. As coal and nuclear generation expand within Japan’s constrained power system, they may displace domestic renewable energy — an alternative capable of delivering equivalent energy security benefits at lower cost. This displacement could increase curtailment, undermine investment in new renewable capacity, raise consumer costs, and impede progress toward decarbonization. Japan risks addressing one energy security challenge by reinforcing the conditions that created it. Japan’s established policy response: Coal and nuclear Japan’s response to energy security concerns prioritizes two established measures — expanding coal-fired generation to conserve LNG in the short term and accelerating nuclear restarts over the medium and long term. However, this strategy does not address the underlying factors driving import dependence. Coal expansion On 27 March 2026, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced the temporary suspension of the utilization rate cap (50%) on inefficient coal-fired power plants (CFPPs) for fiscal year (FY) 2026. Inefficient CFPPs are defined as those operating below 42% thermal efficiency, with a combined capacity of approximately 9 gigawatts (GW). Raising the utilization rates for such plants could reduce LNG consumption by an estimated 500,000 tonnes annually. On the surface, this approach appears consistent with Japan’s energy security concerns, as approximately 71% of its imported coal comes from Australia, thereby reducing direct exposure to Middle Eastern supply risks. However, practical constraints have already emerged that may limit the effectiveness of this measure. In March 2026, J-Power’s Matsuura CFPP, with a capacity of 2,000 megawatts (MW) in the Kyushu area, reduced its output by 50% due to difficulties procuring diesel fuel for plant operations. Similarly, JFE Steel’s Fukuyama facility halted a thermal unit due to a shortage of heavy oil. These developments suggest that even coal-fired generation remains indirectly exposed to disruptions in oil supply chains, potentially constraining the extent to which coal can substitute for LNG. Nuclear restarts: Accelerating an existing policy direction Alongside short-term measures, the current Middle East situation may reinforce Japan’s longer-term policy direction toward nuclear power. Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 (KK6) nuclear power plant, with 1,356MW of installed capacity, was restarted on 21 January 2026, 14 years after the Fukushima accident. It entered commercial operation on 16 April 2026, following a delayed startup marked by multiple shutdowns due to technical faults. KK6 is expected to displace approximately 1.1 million tonnes of LNG annually. Japan’s LNG imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz amount to around 4 million tonnes each y